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property rights. 50 But different concerns independent of prop-
erty interests may give rise to a right to vote; for example,
courts have recognized that citizens must have an equal voice
in the affairs of their local schools.5 1 Courts testing the valid-
ity of extraterritorial exercises of power unaccompanied by the
franchise should ask whether any of the specific powers exer-
cised involve direct and significant encroachment upon private
rights.
When this approach is applied to Alabama's system of
extraterritorial government, the grant of criminal jurisdiction
to the municipal courts is seen to be particularly trouble-
some. Tuscaloosa has the authority to enforce all of its ordi-
nances - including one adopting all state misdemeanors5 2 -
in its police jurisdiction.5 3 While this authority falls far short
of that exerted in maintaining a comprehensive criminal code,
its exercise can profoundly affect private rights. It may be
true that the extraterritorial effect of the ordinances of some
Alabama cities amounts to no more than benign traffic regu-
lation. But the right of citizens to vote should be determined
by reference to the most intrusive, rather than the least intru-
sive, exercises of power over them.
By resting its analysis on the legitimacy of residency lines,
the Supreme Court avoided announcing firm principles for
determining what exercises of extraterritorial municipal powers
must be strictly scrutinized if not accompanied by the fran-
chise. Until it articulates such principles, basing them on the
significance of the specific powers exercised, the danger re-
mains that municipalities will fail to derive their just powers
from the consent of the governed.
D. Freedom of Speech, Press, and Association
Discovery from Media Defendants in Public Figure Defa-
mation Actions. - In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ' and
so The Court did not, however, question Alabama's authorization of extraterritorial
licensing of businesses, a power that may have a dramatic impact upon property.
51 See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Locklear v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 514 F.2d 1152 (4 th Cir. 1975). Justice Stevens
pointed out that Tuscaloosa does not control the operation of Holt's schools. 439 U.S.
at 77.
52 TuSCALOOSA, ALA., CODE § 23-I (1962 & Supp. I975), cited in 439 U.S. at 82
n.io (Brennan, J., dissenting).
S3 AiA. CODE § 12-r4-1(b) (I975).
1 376 U.S. 254 (x964).
1979]
HeinOnline -- 93 Harv. L. Rev.  149 1979-1980
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
its progeny, 2 the Supreme Court established that a public
figure cannot prevail in a defamation action unless he proves
with "convincing clarity"3 that the defendant published a de-
famatory falsehood "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 4 Last Term,
in Herbert v. Lando, 5 the Court held that the first amendment
does not bar a public figure defamation plaintiffs direct in-
quiries during discovery into the states of mind or editorial
communications of media defendants.
In February, 1973, the CBS documentary program "Sixty
Minutes" carried a segment titled "The Selling of Colonel Her-
bert," narrated by Mike Wallace and produced and directed
by Barry Lando. Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert, a war
hero suddenly relieved of his battalion command in Vietnam,
had publicly accused his superior officers of covering up Amer-
ican atrocities. 6 The CBS broadcast juxtaposed filmclips of
Wallace's interviews with Herbert and his detractors in a man-
ner which cast doubts on Herbert's accusations.
7
Herbert sued Lando, Wallace, and CBS8 in a federal di-
versity action, demanding over forty-four million dollars in
damages for injury to his reputation and impairment of his
autobiography as a literary property.9 During extensive pre-
trial discovery, Herbert deposed Lando for more than a year,
during which time Lando complied with nearly all discovery
requests. ° However, Lando refused to answer particular
questions about his "conclusions, opinions, intentions, or con-
versations concerning people or leads to be pursued, the ve-
racity of persons interviewed, and [his] reasons for the inclu-
sion or exclusion of certain material." 1' Finding the
information sought both relevant to the subject matter of the
action and not privileged by the first amendment, 12 the district
2 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 428 U.S. 323 (,974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
3 376 U.S. at 285-86; accord, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30
(971) ("clear and convincing proof').
4 376 U.S. at 280. See generally Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349
(1975).
5 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
6 See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 98o-82 (2d Cir. 1977).
7 Id. at 982.
8 Herbert also sued Atlantic Monthly, which published Lando's post-broadcast
account of the Colonel's "decanonization." See Lando, The Herbert Affair, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, May, 1973, at 73.
9 See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1977).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 995 (Oakes, J., concurring).
" Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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court concluded that the information fell within the broad
scope of discovery permitted by the federal rules of civil pro-
cedure. 13 The district judge therefore granted Herbert's mo-
tion to compel discovery. 14  On interlocutory appeal, 15 a di-
vided Second Circuit panel remanded, holding that Lando had
an absolute first amendment privilege not to answer questions
concerning the "editorial process" underlying the broadcast.
16
The Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the six-man majority,1 7 Justice White main-
tained that the Sullivan "actual malice" standard18 adequately
balanced a libel plaintiffs reputational interests against the
first amendment's guarantee of a free press. 19 The-first amend-
ment did not, therefore, additionally require a plaintiff to
forfeit discovery of evidence critical to proving his claim. In-
deed, by making it "essential to proving liability that plaintiffs
focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant,"20
Sullivan and its offspring accentuated a public figure plaintiffs
13 Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I):
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.... It is not
ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
14 73 F.R.D. at 406; see FED. R. CrV. P. 37(a)(2).
Is See 28 U.S.C. § 129 2(b) (1976).
16 Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Kaufman and
Judge Oakes, in separate but overlapping opinions, found constitutional protection for
the editorial process in the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (974) (holding unconstitutional a statute re-
quiring newspapers to grant right of reply to political candidates), and Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (no first
amendment violation when broadcaster refuses to accept paid political advertising).
Judge Oakes derived additional support for the absolute privilege from "the Supreme
Court's evolving recognition of the special status of the press in our governmental
system." 568 F.2d at 986. But cf. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First
Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 225 (recent Supreme Court press cases
consistently hold that first amendment affords no privileges to institutional press
beyond those available to public at large).
17 Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion while Justices Stewart and Marshall
filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice Brennan dissented in part.
'8 "Actual malice," defined by Sullivan as defendant's knowledge of the falsity, or
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity, of his publication, 376 U.S. at 280, is distinct
from "common law malice" - defendant's ill will, spite, or hostility - which a pre-
Sullivan libel plaintiff had to prove to enhance damages or to defeat defendant's
assertion of a conditional privilege. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTS 794-95 (4 th ed. i971). Because Justice Stewart believed that most of Herbert's
questions would uncover only evidence of Lando's common law malice, he deemed
them irrelevant to the issue of Lando's "actual malice." See 99 S. Ct. at i66i. See
also note 40 infra.
19 99 S. Ct. 1638-50.
20 Id. at 1641.
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need for state of mind discovery. Justice White did not agree
with the Second Circuit that Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo2' and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee2 2 had entirely immunized a media
defendant's editorial processes against an adversary's pretrial
scrutiny;23 in his view, those decisions held only that govern-
ments may not dictate in advance what the news media must
or must not publish.
24
Justice White contended that an editorial process privilege
would alter the balance of interests struck in Sullivan by
substantially interfering with a libel plaintiff's ability to carry
his burden of proof.25 He noted, furthermore, that the pro-
posed privilege might shield from discovery not only Lando's
beliefs about the veracity of his material, but any knowledge
his personal research or communications with colleagues might
have revealed about the material's truth or falsity. 26  The
majority discounted the possibility that compelling disclosure
of editors' conversations and reporters' beliefs would unconsti-
tutionally chill editorial decisionmaking; 27 permitting discovery
would discourage only "publication of erroneous information
known to be false or probably false."' 28 In the Court's opinion,
the existence of some constitutional protection of editorial dis-
cussions from "casual inquiry" 29 did not justify recognition of
an absolute privilege when the opposing party has "a demon-
strated specific need for evidence."' 30 The majority was con-
vinced that trial judges applying existing discovery provisions
already have "ample powers" to curb discovery abuse by re-
quiring relevance, 31 by issuing protective orders, 32 and by
construing the rules to secure speedy and inexpensive deter-
minations of defamation actions.
33
21 418 U.S. 241 (I974).
22 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
23 99 S. Ct. at 1643-45. See also note 6 supra.
24 99 S. Ct. at 1645.
25 Id. at 1646.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1646-47.
28 Id. Justice White posited that exposing editorial discussion to discovery would
not dampen frank exchanges of fact and opinion in the newsroom. In fact, he
contended that the ever-present threat of liability for knowing or reckless error would
provide journalists with incentive to maintain error-avoiding procedures. Id. at
2648. But see p. I58 infra.
29 99 S. Ct. at 2648. The majority expressly noted that a "law that subjects the
editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to
serve some general end such as the public interest" would not survive first amendment
scrutiny. Id.
30 Id.
31 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(I); note 13 supra.
32 see FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
33
See FED. R. Civ. P. i.
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The other Justices were, however, far less sanguine that
judicial application of existing rules could sufficiently limit
discovery abuse. In a concurring opinion strongly reminiscent
of his earlier special concurrences in press cases, 34 Justice
Powell urged judges making discovery rulings to consider first
amendment interests when balancing the rights of the plaintiff
and the press. 35  Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, sided
with the majority in rejecting a privilege shielding reporters'
mental processes from examination, 36 but considered a quali-
fied constitutional privilege necessary to protect editors' "pre-
decisional communications." 37 Justice Marshall, dissenting,
also conceded that a journalist's state of mind should be dis-
coverable. 38 He cautioned, however, that libel actions are
particularly fertile ground for discovery abuse, 39 and therefore
argued for an absolute privilege altogether foreclosing discov-
ery of "the substance of editorial conversation." 
4o
In Herbert, the Justices confronted an issue poised at the
confluence of three legal doctrines: the common law tort of
defamation, the first amendment, and the liberal philosophy
of civil discovery. 41 At the outset, however, the majority
asserted that the Sullivan standard had already forged the
ultimate accommodation between the first amendment and a
public figure's reputational interests. In effect, the Court re-
duced its inquiry to whether, in light of a public figure plain-
tiffs heavy burden of proof, a media defendant's editorial
process should be immunized from discovery. Rather than
treating that issue as one of first impression, 42 the majority
then erroneously concluded that constitutional and common
law precedent had already considered and rejected an editorial
process privilege. 43 Had the Court acknowledged that prior
34 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 568 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). See also note
45 infra.
3S 99 S. Ct. at 165o--Si (Powell, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 1657 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
37 Id. at i651.
38 Id. at 1665-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 1664.
40 Id. at 1666. Only Justice Stewart, dissenting, did not evaluate whether the
information sought should have been privileged. See note 18 supra.
41 Although the Second Circuit apparently intended its editorial process privilege
to extend beyond pretrial discovery to trial itself, see Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d
974, 995 n.38 (2d Cir. i977) (Oakes, J., concurring), each of the Supreme Court
opinions analyzed the need for the proposed privilege solely within the context of
discovery.
42 The district court judge had assumed that the case raised a question of first
impression. See Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); cf. 99 S.
Ct. at 1652 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) ("a novel and difficult question of law").
43 See 99 S. Ct. at z641-45 & nn.6-15. None of the cases cited by the majority
expressly disproved the existence of an editorial process privilege. The pre-Sullivan
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decisions did not foreclose the existence of an editorial privi-
lege, it would have been obliged to decide whether judicial
authorization of discovery into the editorial process unduly
burdens the first amendment values that Sullivan sought to
protect. The majority's misreading of precedent led it instead
to insist that Lando present a "clear and convincing" case in
favor of such a privilege. 44 Once the issue had been framed
in this way, Lando's failure to persuade a majority to adopt
his position was hardly surprising, given the Court's recent
decisions uniformly rejecting special privileges for the press.
45
A further weakness in the majority's analysis lay in its
failure even to attempt a definition of the concept of "editorial
process." Despite its acknowledgment that editorial process
deserves some first amendment protection from casual in-
cases demonstrated only that state of mind evidence is admissible to prove the de-
fendant's common law malice, see note i8 supra. Similarly, since the libel defendant
introduced evidence of his own state of mind in many of the post-Sullivan cases, see
99 S. Ct. at 1647 n.21, those cases merely affirmed the relevance and admissibility of
evidence of the editorial process in defamation cases. Thus, the precedent cited by
the majority suggested only that such a privilege, if it exists, may be voluntarily
waived. Cf. Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1752 (1979) (admissibility or relevance of criminal defendant's testi-
mony does not invalidate his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).
44 99 S. Ct. at 1646.
4' See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. i (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (i974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. 665 (1972). See
generally Blanchard, supra note i6.
Indeed, Justice White's analysis in Herbert repeatedly echoed his earlier opinions
for nearly identical majorities in two criminal discovery cases: Branzburg v. Hayes,
4o8 U.S. 665 (1972) (denying newsmen special testimonial privilege to withhold in-
formation about confidential sources from grand jury), and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978) (denying newsrooms special protection from searches under prop-
erly drawn warrants). Although in each of the three cases the majority recognized
some first amendment protection of the press' right to acquire, process, or disseminate
news, compare p. 152 supra with Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 566 and
Branzhurg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 707, the Court invariably rejected any argument
that such protection derived from the free press clause's independent recognition of
special status for the press, compare Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 565 with
Branzburg v. Hayes, 4o8 U.S. at 684. In each case, the majority asserted that the
status quo properly balanced the litigants' need for evidence against the press' first
amendment interests, and thus refused to adopt additional procedural or substantive
safeguards to counteract any incremental chilling effect resulting from discovery.
Compare pp. I51-52 supra with Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 559, 566 and
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 688, 693-94. The majority instead assumed that
a judge or magistrate could protect first amendment interests through strict adminis-
tration of existing discovery rules. Compare p. 152 supra with Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. at 567 and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 708. Each time,
however, Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion urging the judge or magistrate to
heed first amendment values when enforcing those provisions. See note 34 supra.
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quiry,4 6 the majority rejected Lando's claim in part because
it considered the outlines of the editorial process too malleable
to permit confinement of a privilege protecting that
process. 47 Had the Court sought primarily to safeguard first
amendment interests, however, it could have recognized con-
stitutional protection for the heart of the editorial process -
for example, a reporter's work product4 8 as well as oral and
written communications with his editor - without detailing
the contours of the concept. Indeed, if the Court had taken
as a starting point its own tentative definitions of an editor's
functions from Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Dem-
ocratic National Committee49 and Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,5 0 it could then have directed lower courts to
delineate the precise boundaries of those functions on a case-
by-case basis.
The Court's unwillingness to follow that course suggests
that its result rested primarily on a conviction that discovery
of the editorial process would not chill publication of truthful
information. In fact, the Court's assumption that the "actual
malice" standard sufficiently protects first amendment interests
underestimated the potential chilling effect of editorial process
discovery. The Herbert majority thus failed to heed the ad-
monition of the Sullivan Court that "fear of the expense" of
defending defamation suits also spurs self-censorship.5 1 Be-
46 See p. 152 & note 29 supra.
47 See p. 152 supra.
48 The Court could have extended a qualified immunity from disclosure to the
"work product" of newsmen preparing stories for publication, analogous to the pro-
tection granted to the "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
S.. mental impressions, [and] personal beliefs" of attorneys preparing for trial in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (i047). See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3). For
one attempt to define such an immunity, see Comment, Constitutional Protection for
the Newsman's Work Product, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (197o). However,
Lando's decision to turn over voluntarily most of his reporter's notes, drafts, interview
transcripts, and videotapes may have contributed to the Court's reluctance to grant
even a qualified immunity to his work product. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974,
982 (2d Cir. 1977) (Kaufman, J.) (describing extent of Lando's production).
49 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973): "For better or worse, editing is what editors are for;
and editing is selection and choice of material."
50 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted):
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment
and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size, and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials - whether fair or unfair -
constitute the exercise of editorial control.
5' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (emphasis added).
See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971) ("The very
possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is
threat enough to cause [self-censorship].").
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cause the Sullivan rule operates only at trial, well after a
media defendant has incurred sizable litigation expenses,
2 it
only partially mitigates self-censorship. Many lower courts
have therefore resorted to summary judgment on the issue of
actual malice in order to give the Sullivan rule prophylactic
effect earlier in the litigation. 53  Summary judgment has thus
served as a procedural device to discourage press self-censor-
ship by reducing the costs of defending libel actions.-
4
Herbert's authorization of direct inquiry into the editorial
process appears likely, however, to increase libel defense costs
in three ways. First, Herbert, Hutchinson v. Proxmire,5 5 and
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.5 6 - all decided
last Term in favor of defamation plaintiffs5 7 - may foster a
perception that the odds of recovery in a defamation action
have improved, and thus increase the number of suits brought
by both public and private figures.5 8  Second, the Court's
explicit recognition that direct state of mind discovery is crucial
in public figure defamation suits5 9 may deter trial courts from
S2 "The basic Times rule merely changes the instructions under which the case is
submitted to the jury; by the time the litigation reaches that point, a major portion
of the defense costs have been incurred." Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship,
53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 436 (1975).
S3 See, e.g., Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 257 (8th Cir. 1972); Time,
Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378 (4 th Cir. 1971); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
426 F.2d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 1970); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. io2 (2967); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Summary judgment is the 'rule,'
and not the exception, in defamation cases."), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.
1976).
54 See io C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2730,
at 592 (i973).
55 99 S. Ct. 2675 (I979).
56 99 S. Ct. 2701 (979).
57 In Proxmire and Wolston, decided on the same day, the Court reversed two
lower court grants of summary judgment in libel actions on the grounds that neither
plaintiff had "voluntarily thrust himself or his views into public controversy" to the
extent necessary to be deemed a public figure under the standard of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 4x8 U.S. 323, 352 (I974). See p. 164 & note 2o infra. As private
individuals, Hutchinson and Wolston need prove only some element of fault as defined
by state defamation law, such as negligence, to recover. See Eaton, supra note 4, at
14o8-47. The problem of defining a public figure never arose in Herbert, however,
for Colonel Herbert conceded that he was a public figure. See 99 S. Ct. at 1639.
58 Herbert may also inspire public figures to engage in more lengthy state of mind
discovery simply because they recognize its value as a tactical weapon to force pretrial
settlement or to harass media critics. See 99 S. Ct. at 1657 n.ii (Brennan, J.,
dissenting in part); id. at 1664 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59 Although the Herbert Court did not explicitly decide whether private figure libel
plaintiffs also deserve state of mind discovery, the majority's language was broad
enough to permit such discovery. See 99 S. Ct. at 1641. Since a private figure libel
plaintiff carries a less onerous burden of proof than his public figure counterpart,
[Vol. 93:6o
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granting summary judgment to media defendants before that
phase of discovery is completed. The price of state of mind
discovery could thus become a fixed cost of defending libel
actions. Third, to the extent that Herbert and Proxmire sug-
gest the Court's disapproval of summary judgment on the issue
of "actual malice,"' 60 those decisions may well dissuade trial
judges from summarily disposing of defamation actions even
after pretrial discovery is completed. 6 1 Even media defendants
with meritorious defenses may thus incur the costs of full-
fledged trials and may risk exposure to adverse verdicts by
unpredictable juries.62 While Justice White has frequently in-
timated his belief that the threat of libel suits will not compel
well-financed media conglomerates to censor themselves, 63 the
chilling effect of his majority opinion is likely to fall most
heavily on lower budget publications and independent broad-
casters. Herbert can only intensify their need to ask not only
if a proposed article or broadcast is truthful, but "whether its
publication will result in a lawsuit, and if so, what the cost of
successfully defending a suit will be."
' 64
however, see note 57 supra, it is not clear that the logic of Herbert also compels trial
judges to condone such discovery. Even private figures who attempt to prove "actual
malice" in order to reap punitive damages have only a weak claim to state of mind
discovery since they may recover full compensation for their injury without such a
showing. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
60 In a footnote to Proxmire, Chief Justice Burger noted that "[t]he proof of 'actual
malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question ... and does not readily lend
itself to summary disposition," Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 268o n.9
(1979) (citing Herbert). This observation is dictum, however, since the Court expressly
did not decide whether the lower court had properly disposed of the case by summary
judgment. Id.
61 Following Herbert, one court has held that a public figure libel plaintiff "need
only present evidence which shows a genuine issue of material fact from which a
reasonable jury could find actual malice with convincing clarity" to defeat a media
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the "actual malice" issue. See Nader
v. De Toledano, 48 U.S.L.W. 2146 (D.C. Ct. App. July 31, 1979).
62 As early as Sullivan, members of the Court expressed their doubts about the
ability of juries to decide defamation cases without bias. See New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result); id. at
295 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring). As a precaution, the Sullivan Court au-
thorized appellate courts to review all factual evidence presented to juries in defa-
mation cases in order independently to evaluate the plaintiff's "actual malice." 376
U.S. at 284-85.
63 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (I974) (White, J.,
dissenting); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (White, J.); Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 6o (I971) (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 796-800 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
64 Anderson, supra note 52, at 438. In 1975, Professor Anderson estimated that
"[t]he cost of defending a full-fledged libel suit probably begins at about $20,ooo and
can run much higher." Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted). Lando's costs in the discov-
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Furthermore, direct inquiry into editorial communications
may impede the accurate reporting of news by dampening the
frequency and frankness of newsroom exchanges. Professor
Blasi's empirical study of journalists' responses to the threat
of subpoena revealed that fear of discovery most adversely
affects reporters "who check and cross-check their information
with numerous sources ...and who keep extensive files and
tapes for future verification reference and for trend
stories."' 65 The same editorial discussion which may lead a
reporter to undertake fresh research - for example, an editor
expressing doubts about a source's veracity - would provide
damaging evidence if discovered and introduced in a libel
suit.66 Fear of editorial conversation discovery may deter re-
porters from recording recollections or confiding doubts to col-
leagues, and thus hinder effective news reporting.
Unregulated "editorial process" discovery thus appears
likely to chill the dissemination of truthful as well as erroneous
information. Nevertheless, the majority's failure to seek a "less
restrictive alternative" to total repudiation of the Second Cir-
cuit's absolute privilege demonstrated the Court's unwilling-
ness to recognize or reduce that chill.6 7 Both majority and
dissent correctly noted that a privilege against direct state of
mind questions is superfluous, not because journalists' states
of mind lack constitutional protection, but because their actual
thoughts cannot be chilled. 68 Since threats of discovery can,
however, chill a reporter's decision to express those thoughts,
the majority should have searched for a solution less likely to
expose to routine discovery a reporter's work product as well
as his written and oral communications with fellow news-
men. 
6 9
Each of Herbert's five opinions evidences the Justices' com-
mon concern that unchecked discovery has contributed to har-
ery phase of Herbert, stretching over 26 deposition sessions, have undoubtedly ex-
ceeded that figure already. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir:
1977). See also p. iSo supra.
65 Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229,
271 (i97i).
66 See 99 S. Ct. at r659 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
67 The Court has frequently employed "less restrictive alternative" analysis in first
amendment cases. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See
generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464
(r969).
68 None of the nine Justices argued in favor of a privilege protecting the individual
journalist's state of mind. See, e.g., 99 S. Ct. at 1647 (White, J.); id. at 1657
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part); id. at i665-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 See note 48 supra.
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assment of parties, protracted depositions, and "mushrooming
litigation costs."' 70  Ironically, they also mirror the Justices'
marked disagreement over district judges' ability to protect
first amendment interests adequately through existing discovery
rules. Though each Justice contemplated that judges would
closely superintend discovery in libel cases, the Justices di-
verged about the need for a new rule of law to supplement
current discovery provisions. Justice White's majority opinion
simply invited the trial judge to administer existing discovery
provisions stringently.71 Yet a solution merely instructing the
judge to reject "casual" discovery requests on grounds of lack
of relevance or undue burden fails to indicate when first
amendment values are at stake. 72  Similarly, Justice Powell's
suggestion that first amendment values be "weighed care-
fully"' 73 in no way indicates to the trial judge how much
weight to accord those interests.
Only Justice Brennan, the author of Sullivan, called for
judicial intervention to administer a qualified rule granting
editors' and reporters' "[ildeas expressed in conversations,
memoranda, handwritten notes and the like" presumptive pro-
tection against discovery. 74 Justice Brennan's standard would
oblige the public figure plaintiff to establish, to the trial judge's
satisfaction, a prima facie case that the defamatory publication
was false.7 5 That prima facie showing would substantiate the
plaintiff's claim of injury and verify his specific need for evi-
70 99 S. Ct. at 1649 (White, J.). See also id. at 165o (Powell, J., concurring); id.
at 1657 & n.ii (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1662 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
id. at 664 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7' See p. 152 supra.
72 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, -in effect applying Justice White's solution,
illustrates that judges may sharply differ when deciding whether certain questions are
strictly relevant to the issue of "actual malice." See note 18 supra.
73 99 S. Ct. at x65I. See p. 153 supra.
74 99 S. Ct. at i658 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Oakes, J., concurring)). Justice Marshall, by contrast, argued for an absolute rule
of privilege for editorial conversations, which would have eliminated judicial discretion
to allow discovery even when the plaintiffs need is particularly great. When certain
information is available only from reporters, however, absolutely shielding it from
discovery would effectively bar libel plaintiffs from carrying their burden of proof.
Cf. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) (reporter denied absolute privilege
against disclosure of confidential sources in libel action), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
7- 99 S. Ct. at I65i, i66o. To demonstrate prima facie falsehood, the plaintiff
would have to make a showing sufficient to resist summary judgment on the issue of
falsity. For example, the trial judge could require the plaintiff to buttress his motion
to compel discovery with affidavits from competent witnesses swearing that the de-
fendant's publication was false.
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dence of the journalist's state of mind. Only then would in-
trusion into the editorial process be justified.
76
Although the Herbert majority did not accept Justice Bren-
nan's compromise, 7" the spirit of the Brennan proposal may
still offer guidance to trial judges confronted with requests for
discovery into the editorial process. Adoption of the "qualified
privilege" would merely have mandated a discovery schedule
granting media defendants the opportunity to move for sum-
mary judgment early in libel litigation against plaintiffs who
could not produce sufficient factual evidence of falsity. After
Herbert, judges retain the option in defamation suits to sched-
ule discovery issue by issue, in order to alleviate the adverse
impact on the press of totally unfettered editorial process dis-
covery. In the hope of obtaining summary judgment before
the onset of editorial process discovery, media defendants
could ask judges at the pretrial conference 78 to postpone state
of mind discovery until the very end of the pretrial period.
9
Judicial willingness to grant summary judgment when plain-
tiffs are unable to demonstrate falsity would reduce the chilling
effect arising from press fears of extended and costly litiga-
tion. At the same time, individual journalists would have an
incentive to ensure the accuracy of their stories in order to
deflect inquiries probing their states of mind.
80
Thus, even after Herbert, judges mindful of the first
amendment may employ these procedural devices to screen out
those plaintiffs intent upon using discovery as an in terrorem
device to force settlements; the substantive Sullivan standard
will then bar from recovery the remaining plaintiffs who can-
76 Justice Marshall criticized Justice Brennan's qualified privilege on the ground
that the press would continue to be chilled so long as reporters were aware that their
conversations might possibly be discovered. See 99 S. Ct. at i666; accord, Herbert
v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 994 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring). Professor Blasi's
study suggested, however, that "[im]any newsmen . . would be happy to accede to
more qualifications and exceptions in the wording of a privilege if the probability
were thereby increased that the Supreme Court would recognize the basic principle
of a newsman's privilege." Blasi, supra note 65, at 283.
77 Justice White dismissed Justice Brennan's suggestion as contemplating either a
lengthy bifurcated trial or a formalistic verification of the pleadings. 99 S. Ct. at 1648
n.23. In fact, Justice Brennan seems to have contemplated that the plaintiff would
make a showing that need not satisfy the burden of proof at trial but which would
exceed mere allegation. See note 75 supra.
7 8 
See FED. R. Civ. P. I6.
79 Indeed, Justice Powell explicitly approved use of delayed discovery and sum-
mary judgment on issues other than actual malice when necessary to protect first
amendment interests. See 99 S. Ct. at r65i n.4. Since state of mind discovery would
be most useful to a plaintiff only after he had established a factual foundation for
disputing the defendant's claim of good faith publication, postponing that discovery
would not unduly prejudice plaintiffs.
so Cf. p. I58 supra (discussing contrary effect of majority's solution).
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not prove "actual malice." Herbert's rejection of an absolute
editorial process privilege does not oblige trial judges to con-
done unjustified intrusions into editorial communications. Pru-
dent use of discovery schedules and grants of summary judg-
ment on the falsity issue will moderate the chilling effect
lingering after Herbert, without upsetting the substantive bal-
ance between the rights of public figures and the press first
struck in Sullivan.
E. Immunity Under Speech or Debate Clause
Legislator's Liability for Repeating Defamatory Statements
Outside Halls of Congress. - In 1972, in Gravel v. United
States, I the Supreme Court held that the speech or debate
clause of the Constitution 2 did not shield a United States
Senator from answering grand jury questions about his ar-
ranging private publication of a subcommittee's hearing rec-
ord. Last Term, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,3 the Court held
that the speech or debate clause did not shield a Senator from
liability for defamatory remarks originally made in the Senate
4
but repeated to the press and in newsletters to constituents. 5
Taken together, these cases indicate a retrenchment of the
speech or debate privilege. The Proxmire decision in partic-
ular will inhibit vigorous public debate by legislators by open-
ing them to private lawsuit for publicizing their criticisms of
1 408 U.S. 6o6 (972).
2 The speech or debate clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either
House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
3 99 S. Ct. 2675 (i979).
4 Proxmire was uncertain whether he actually delivered the speech on the floor or
merely inserted it into the Congressional Record. The Court assumed, without decid-
ing, that a speech printed in the Record carries the same immunity as though it had
been delivered on the floor. Id. at 2678 n.3.
5 In another case decided last Term, United States v. Helstoski, 99 S. Ct. 2432
(1979), the Court held that the speech or debate clause prohibits evidence of legislative
acts from being introduced in a prosecution of a member of Congress. While the tone
of the Helstoski opinion - reflecting "the central importance of the Clause for
preventing intrusion by [the] executive and judiciary into the legislative sphere," id.
at 2441 - differs markedly from that in Proxmire, the cases do not conflict. Proxmire
seeks to define the scope of immunized "legislative acts." Helstoski assumes the
existence of a "legislative act" and addresses the issue of whether evidence of such
acts may be admitted in a criminal case. In fact, 'dictum in Helstoski supports
Proxmire's narrow definition of a legislative act: "A promise to deliver a speech, to
vote, or to solicit other votes at some future date is not 'speech or debate.' Likewise,
a promise to introduce a bill is not a legislative act." 99 S. Ct. at 2440 (emphasis in
original). For commentary on the issues reflected in Helstoski, see generally Note,
Evidentiary Implications of the Speech or Debate Clause, 88 YALE L.J. 128o (,979).
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